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I. Introduction
Between 2006 and 2007, major news outlets devoted marquee coverage to the
low-income financial crisis of the day: payday loans.' The media convened experts
on payday lending who cautioned against the industry's usurious fees and the cyclical
refinancing trap into which cash-strapped borrowers often fell.2 Momentum began
to build to create a federal solution to a problem that had long eluded effective state
regulation.
At the same time, major banks began to publicize their efforts to make
mainstream consumer banking services, like checking accounts and credit cards,
generally available to the undocumented immigrant population New legislation
included in the USA Patriot Act of 20014 allowed banks, for the first time, to legally
1. See generally A Call for Payday Lending Reform, NPR, NEWS & NOTES, Apr. 27,
2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=9875136 (last visited on Apr.
17, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice);
Minding Your Money: Payday Lending, NPR, NEWS & NOTES, Apr. 27, 2007,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=9875133 (last visited on Apr. 17,
2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); A
Day at the Payday Loan Center, NPR, NEWS & NOTES, Apr. 27, 2007,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=9875139 (last visited on Apr. 17,
2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice);
Payday Loans Plague New Mexico's Working Poor, NPR, MORNING EDITION, Feb. 5, 2007,
http://www.npr.org/search.php?sort=DREDATE:numberdecreasing &start=40&topicld--0&
prgld--0&howjlong-ago=0&matchany=false&aggld--0&stopwords=false&soundex=false&t
ext=payday%201oan (last visited on Apr. 17, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Erik Eckholm, Seductively Easy, Payday Loans
Often Snowball, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23 2006, at Al, available at http://www.
nytimes.comI/2006/12/23/us/23payday.html ?scp=5&sq=payday% 20loans&st=cse.
2. See, e.g., Eckholm, supra note 1 (noting that "[olver several months, [borrowers]
can easily spend far more on fees than they ever received in cash and may end up by
borrowing from multiple sites to pay off others" if they refinance frequently); see also
Madeline Brand, "Shortchanged": Preying on Low-Income Americans, NPR, DAY TO DAY,
Apr. 27, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4930888 (last visited
on Apr. 17, 2009) (quoting Howard Karger quipping that the payday loan industry charges
higher rates than the mafia) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
3. See Scott Horsley, Bank Defends Credit Cards for Illegal Immigrants, NPR, ALL
THINGS CONSIDERED, Feb. 13, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templateslstory/story.php
?storyld=7388709 (last visited on Apr. 17, 2009) (same) (describing a Bank of America pilot
credit card program for undocumented immigrants that requires immigrant customers to
open a checking account with Bank of America) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Miriam Jordan & Bob Justich, Should U.S.
Businesses Market to Illegal Immigrants?, NPR, TALK OF THE NATION, Feb. 13, 2007,
http://www.npr.org/ templates/story/story.php?storyld=7385444 (same) (last visited on Apr.
17, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
4. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter
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open accounts for and lend to undocumented immigrants, provided the immigrant
could present a valid individual taxpayer identification number (ITIN) and a second
piece of foreign-source identification.
5
With access to mainstream banking products, banked undocumented
immigrants ae at risk for abuse by the payday loan industry. Lack of experience
with checking and savings accounts, difficult economic conditions, and an inability to
use the existing law to protect against abusive lending practices make the
undocumented immigrant population a prime target for payday lenders. Existing
federal and state legislation has, so far, done little to protect citizens from abusive
payday lending practices, and state efforts at industry reform do not include special
protection for the undocumented community.6  The recession provides an
environment in which payday lending can thrive.7 But for the first time, lawmakers
have begun to debate two recently proposed federal bills that purport to curb abusive
lending by the payday loan industry!8 The first would ban payday lending, while the
USA Patriot Act] (expanding bank "Customer Identification Program" requirements to allow
ITINs plus another foreign source piece of identification to furnish adequate documentation
for the bank to have a reasonable idea of who it is lending to).
5. See Customer Identification Programs for Banks, Savings Associations, Credit
Unions, & Certain Non-Federally Regulated Banks, 31 U.S.C.S. § 5318(1) (2001) codified at
31 C.F.R. § 103.121 (describing the types of information that a bank must obtain before
opening an account for an undocumented immigrant). The regulations provide that banks:
must implement a written Customer Identification Program (CIP)
[that]... include[s] risk-based procedures... [that] enable the bank to form a
reasonable belief that it knows the true identity of each customer. At a
minimum [that bank must obtain] the following information from the customer
prior to opening an account:
(1) Name;
(2) Date of birth, for an individual;
(3) Address,
(4) Identification number, which shall be: ....
(ii) For a non-U.S. person, one or more of the following: a taxpayer
identification number; passport number and country of issuance; alien
identification card number; or number and country of issuance of any other
government-issued document evidencing nationality or residence and bearing a
photograph or similar safeguard.
Id. at § 103.121(b)(2)(i)(A).
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See NPR Planet Money Blog, Get $20,000 Today, http://www.npr.org/
blogs/money/2009/01/quick-cashincrisis.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2009) (providing
anecdotal evidence that the number of payday loan outlets is increasing during the recession)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
8. See Editorial, 391 Percent Payday Loan, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 12, 2009, at A20,
available at http://www.nytimes.com2009/04/13/opinionll3mon2.html?scp=2&sq=payday
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second would do little to reform the payday loan industry. Better federal regulation
would find a compromise between the two proposed bills, and Congress should work
toward such a solution.
To illustrate the need to reform in this area, Part II of this Note explains how
payday lending works and evaluates the efficacy of the payday loan as a source of
short-term credit for low- and moderate-income individuals. Part HII compares
demographic characteristics of payday loan customers with the characteristics of
Hispanic undocumented immigrants to show why the payday loan industry could
find the undocumented immigrant population an attractive target consumer base.
This Note focuses on Hispanic undocumented immigrants because they are by far the
largest nationality represented in the undocumented population.9 Part IV discusses
federal and state laws that govern the industry, explains why state regulation has been
inadequate, and evaluates recent federal legislation purporting to offer reform. Part V
proposes basic elements necessary for effective reform and suggests ways to
implement those reforms. Lawmakers must not waste the opportunity to curtail
abusive lending by the payday loan industry, but given the size of the undocumented
population in the United States,10 it is vitally important that any effort to curb payday
lending include protection for undocumented immigrants.
II. Portrait of the Payday Loan Industry
A. Industry History
Until the late nineteenth century, state usury laws prevented lenders from
offering short-term consumer loans." Around 1900, unlicensed lenders began
%201oans&st=cse (discussing new House bill sponsored by Rep. Luis Gutierrez (D) that
would "allow payday operators to charge what amounts to an annual percentage rate of 391
percent"); Bob Driehaus, Ohio Seeks to End Interest Abuses in Payday Loans, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 2009, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2O09/04/16/us/l6ohio.html
?scp=3&sq=payday% 20loans&st=cse (describing the failure of "[a]n Ohio law intended to
cap interest rates on payday loans at 28 percent [, which] has been thwarted by lenders who
have found ways to charge up to 680 percent interest); Eckholm, supra note 1 (describing
how industry lobbyists killed efforts to regulate payday loans in New Mexico).
9. See PEW HISPANIC CENTER, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2008, at
1 (2009), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/47.pdf ("Mexicans now account
for 32% of all immigrants living in this country. The second-largest nationality group of
immigrants, Filipinos, account for just 5% of all immigrants in the U.S.").
10. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, REPORT, A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES (Pew Hispanic Ctr. 2009), available at
http:l/pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf (estimating the undocumented immigrant
population to be between 8.3 and 11.9 million).
11. JOHN P. CAKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND
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offering the first payday loans, termed "salary purchase agreements," in which "the
lender 'buys' the borrower's wages at a discount in advance of the borrower's
payday. '12 Between 1916 and 1935, most states adopted small loan laws that defined
salary purchase agreements as small loans, in order to bring these so-called purchase
agreements within state usury ceilings. 3 At the same time, these states provided a
higher usury rate ceiling that allowed a legal small loan industry to emerge.14 Until
recently, payday lending remained a relatively small industry.
Evidence suggests that the payday lending explosion of the late 1990s and early
2000s followed the deregulation of the financial service markets in the late 1980s,
which allowed mainstream banks to exit the short-term consumer loan market in
order to enter the more lucrative large loan market.15 Payday lenders filled the small,
short-term consumer loan gap: between 1990 and 2002 the number of payday
advance offices grew from a few hundred to more than 25,000, and the industry
"expects to double in size over the next few years."''
16
B. Payday Loans Explained
Payday loans are short-term consumer loans.17 In a typical transaction, the
borrower offers the lender a post-dated check, with the understanding that the lender
will not attempt to cash the check until the borrower's next payday-typically two
weeks from the loan origination date.i8 In retun, the lender provides the borrower
THE POOR 31 (Russell Sage Found. 2004) [hereinafter CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING].
12. Id. at 32.
13. See id. ("The Uniform Small Loan Laws, which many states adopted between
1916 and 1935 ... defined salary buying as cash lending, thereby subjecting it to small loan
regulations.").
14. Id.
15. GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & EDWARD C. LAWRENCE, PAYDAY ADVANCE CREDIT IN
AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMER DEMAND 1 (Georgetown Univ. Press 2001)
[hereinafter Georgetown Survey], available at http://www.creditresearch.org/editor/assets/
files/Georgetown.pdf (explaining that operating costs increase less than proportionately with
loan size in the consumer finance industry, such that larger loans have lower costs per dollar
of credit than smaller loans).
16. HOWARD KARGER, SHORTCHANGED: LIFE AND DEBT IN THE FRINGE ECONOMY 73
(Berrett-Koehler 2005).
17. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 11, at 30.
18. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., PREDATORY SMALL LOANS: A FORM OF
LOANSHARKING, http://www.consumerlaw.orglissues/paydayjoans/pay-menu.shtml#_ftn2
(last visited on Apr. 17, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights
and Social Justice); see also Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or
Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1, 10 (2002) (explaining that most lenders also
require borrowers to present a driver's license, pay stub, bank statement, and telephone bill
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with cash in an amount less than the face value of the check.' 9 The difference
between the face amount of the check and the amount received by the borrower is the
loan fee, which ranges from about fifteen to twenty dollars per one hundred dollars
borrowed. 0 When the check date arrives, the borrower can either (1) repay the
principal and take back the original check, (2) allow the payday lender to deposit the
check, (3) allow the check to bounce, or (4) pay a fee to refinance the principal until
the next pay period, paying the same fifteen to twenty dollar loan fee each time the
loan is refinanced.21 Should the borrower choose to refinance the loan, the loan fee
never constitutes repayment of the outstanding principal balance.22  If a borrower
refinances five or six times, she can incur fees far in excess of the loan principal.
23
C. Efficacy of Payday Loans as a Source of Short-Term Financing
Critics of the industry argue that payday lenders do not improve access
to short-term credit and that payday loans destroy the finances of working
middle and lower income Americans.24 When viewed as an annual
percentage rate (APR), the fees charged by payday lenders grossly exceed
normal APRs for even high-risk borrowers.2 5 On average, payday lenders
to prove that they are not insolvent).
19. See id. at 9-10 ("[A] nontraditional lender makes a small cash advance (ranging
from $50 to $1000) to the consumer in exchange for the consumer's post-dated personal
check written for the amount of the loan plus a fee.").
20. See Georgetown Survey, supra note 15, at 3 ("Finance charges are typically
between $15 and $20 per $100 of the loan amount.").
21. KARGER, supra note 16, at 74; see also Johnson, supra note 18, at 10 ("Instead of
taking a post-dated check, some lenders require the consumer to authorize a debit to the
consumer's bank account when the loan is due.").
22. Johnson, supra note 18, at 11.
23. See id. at 11 ("No matter how the lender characterizes or collects the fee, the fee
does not count towards the original principal, and the consumer, therefore, remains indebted
until he or she pays the entire original loan in a single payment.").
24. See UNC CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, NORTH CAROLINA CONSUMERS AFTER PAYDAY
LENDING: ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCES WITH CREDIT OPTIONS I (Univ. of N.C. Press 2007)
(explaining findings of a survey of North Carolina residents conducted after the state banned
payday lending in 2006). The report found that (i) "the vast majority of households surveyed
reported being unaffected by the end of payday lending," (ii) "[playday borrowers gave first-
hand accounts of how payday loans are easy to get into but a struggle to get out of," and (iii)
"[n]early nine out of ten households surveyed think that payday lending is a bad thing." Id.
25. See John P. Caskey, Fringe Banking and the Rise of Payday Lending, in CREDIT
MARKETS FOR THE POOR 19 (Patrick Bolton & Howard Rosenthal eds., 2005) [hereinafter
Caskey, Fringe Banking] (noting that despite the fact that payday borrowers have high-risk
credit histories, the lenders do not incur loan losses as high as one might expect). Loan
losses are about 10% to 20% of annual revenues. Id.
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nation-wide charge between 350% and 1000% APR,26 far in excess of the
typical 36% usury ceiling on consumer loans.27
The following hypothetical timeline illustrates how the payday loan industry




(date of original loan)
November 15





Connie takes out a
$300 payday loan and
writes a 14-day
postdated check for
$300 to cover the loan
plus the $60 in interest
charges ($20 per $100
borrowed). She
receives $240 in cash.
Connie cannot repay
the loan and pays
another $60 in interest
fees to extend it. She
receives no additional
money but has now
paid $120 in interest
charges on the original
$300 loan.
Connie extends the loan
again and pays another
$60. She has now paid
$180 in interest charges




26. Id. at 18.
27. See PREDATORY SMALL LOANS: A FORM OF LOANSHARKING, supra note 18
(noting that "twenty states and the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico require payday lenders to
comply with the state's small loan or criminal usury laws which maintain interest rate caps
of up to 36% per annum"); Protecting Consumers from Unreasonable Credit Rates Act of
2009, S. 500, 111 th Cong. (2009) (placing a 36% APR cap on all payday loans); Limitations
on Terms of Consumer Credit Extended to Service Members and Dependents, 10 U.S.C. §
987 (2006) (capping APRs on loans offered to military personnel at 36%).
28. Timeline taken from KARGER, supra note 16, at 74.




(loan due in full)
Connie still can't repay
the original $300 loan,
so she pays yet another
$60 to extend it. In
only eight weeks
Connie has paid $240
in interest charges on
the $240 she received.
The payday lender
deposits Connie's last
check. If there are
insufficient funds in
her account, she will be
charged a non-
sufficient funds (NSF)
fee by the bank and the
lender. The lender will
pursue Connie for the
original $300 which
she still owes.
Although the industry advertises payday loans as short-term solutions
to emergency liquidity problems, data suggest that a significant number of
borrowers use payday loans like credit card advances.29 Over half of all
borrowers take out five or more loans each year, and one third of borrowers
take out twelve or more loans each year.30 Frequent borrowers account for
nearly all of the industry's profits, and profits per borrower increase
exponentially with each additional loan.3 1
Alternatively, less than half of all borrowers take out fewer than five
loans each year and are better able to manage their short-term emergency
29. See KARGER, supra note 16, at 77 (citing a report by the Center for Responsible
Lending (CRL report) that revealed that "only 1% of all payday loans go to one-time
emergency borrowers who pay their loan within two weeks and don't borrow again during
the year").
30. See id. ("Ninety-one percent of all payday loans are made to borrowers with five
or more loans a year. On average, payday customers receive 8-13 loans a year.").
31. See id. (citing the CRL report, which found that "borrowers who receive 5 or more
payday loans a year account for 90% of payday lenders' revenues, and 56% of this revenue
is generated by customers who take out 13 or more loans a year").
$240
$240
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credit needs. To view the fees charged by payday lenders as an APR could
be misleading because most borrowers do not refinance a loan every month
for an entire year.32 Additionally, the payday loan industry argues that it
must charge rates equivalent to at least 100% APR in order to break even,33
and they claim that surveys, which indicate a high rate of customer
satisfaction with the service, prove that the industry's fees are not
34
usurious.
Regardless of whether one is a critic or supporter of payday loans, the
two-week loan repayment schedule is inconsistent with the advertized
purpose of the loan-to help individuals with emergency expenses. If an
individual has an emergency need for cash, she is unable to pay her
emergency expense with her current income plus any savings she might
have. It is highly unlikely that the same individual will make enough
money in the two-week loan period to cover the cost of her extraordinary
expense. Because most people are more likely to incur unexpected
expenses in excess of their income and savings in a recession, payday loans
generally, and especially the loan repayment period, must be adjusted now
through better regulation.
Whether payday loans should be banned, because they are a usurious
and predatory practice, or whether the federal government should attempt to
regulate payday loans, to make them better products for the cohort they aim
to serve, is up for debate in Congress now.35 At the state level,
governments have had only two choices: ban payday lending or allow it to
continue, unregulated, within its borders.36 At the federal level, however,
well-crafted legislation could (1) allow the industry to continue lending and
(2) make the service fair for low-income borrowers. As the recession has
32. Compare Georgetown Survey, supra note 15, at 6 (noting that "nearly four in five
[payday loan customers] had advances outstanding less than half the year.... [and] [o]ver
half of customers' longest consecutive sequence of advances was less than a month"), with
Caskey, Fringe Banking, supra note 25, at 19 ("For example, the annual percentage interest
rate on a two-week $200 loan for which the lender charges $30 is 390% (15 percent for 2
weeks multiplied by 26) [per year in two-week cycles]."). The Caskey formula assumes, of
course, that the borrower actually pays thirty dollars every two weeks for an entire year.
33. See Georgetown Survey, supra note 15, at 5 ("Allowing for taxes and return on
invested capital produced a breakeven annual percentage rate of over 100%.").
34. See id. at 35-36 (noting that 92% of customers strongly agreed or somewhat
agreed with the statement, "Payday advance companies provide a useful service to
consumers,"' and that "over two-thirds of payday advance customers" strongly or somewhat
disagreed that the number of payday loans a customer is allowed to take out in a year should
be limited).
35. See infra Part V.
36. See infra Part IV.
569
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proved, allowing firms to offer unregulated financial products to consumers
can create a fiscal disaster, but effective regulation can make financial
products safe for the public and profitable for firms. This Note, therefore,
does not agree that any federal solution to the payday loan problem for
undocumented immigrants must necessarily ban payday lending, but it does
argue that effective regulation must protect citizens, non-citizens, and
undocumented immigrants from predatory small loan practices.
III. Why Undocumented Immigrants Make Good Payday Loan Customers
A. The Typical Payday Loan Customer
Researchers largely agree on the demographic characteristics of
payday loan customers.37 Given the structure of the transaction, payday
loan customers are typically low- to moderate-income Americans with a
checking account, job, and compromised credit history.38 Borrowers are
also more likely to be female, receive federal assistance, and live in low-
income neighborhoods.39 Indeed, the payday loan industry targets single
mothers and women on welfare, and many lenders will accept disability
payments, child support or alimony payments, and Social Security benefits
as collateral. 4°
Surveys have found that payday loan borrowers are more likely to be
ineligible for home equity credit, to file for bankruptcy, to reach or exceed a
credit card limit, to pawn personal property, or to be ineligible for a credit
37. Caskey, Fringe Banking, supra note 25, at 18.
38. See KARGER, supra note 16, at 72 (noting that payday lenders "generally deal with
the working poor or those with compromised credit); see also Johnson, supra note 18, at 99.
Citing the Georgetown Survey, the article explained that:
Georgetown University professors, using data supplied by payday lenders,
conducted telephone interviews of the customers and reported that 51.5% have
moderate incomes ranging from $25,000 to $49,999. Compare this finding with
a 2001 study by the Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions that
reported an average gross income of $24,673, a 1999 study of data collected by
the Illinois Department of Financial Institutions that found an average income of
$25,131, and a study by the California office of Consumers' Union that
calculated an average annual income of $25,417.
Id.
39. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 100 (noting that minorities and women are far more
likely to use payday lenders and that "low-income and minority households are significantly
more likely to have [check-cashing outlets] located within one mile of their homes than
higher-income and nonminority households").
40. KARGER, supra note 16, at 72, 74-75.
570
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card.4 1  At least one nation-wide survey has found that payday loan
customers on average have attained higher levels of education than the
general population and are familiar with other sources of credit.42 This
finding is consistent with the expectation that payday loan customers are
banked but lack access to other mainstream sources of short-term consumer
credit. Surveys disagree about customers' median salary: the industry
claims that the median customer income is $35,000,4 3 but independent
surveys of states with the highest concentrations of payday lenders find the
median customer income level hovers between $24,000 and $25,000.44
B. Banking Habits of Undocumented Immigrants
Since 2001, the USA Patriot Act has allowed banks to issue checking
accounts and other bank products to undocumented immigrants. 45 As more
undocumented immigrants with jobs begin to open checking accounts with
mainstream banks, they also become eligible for payday loans. For several
reasons, the Hispanic undocumented immigrant population is at risk for
abuse by the payday loan industry. Given the size of the Hispanic
undocumented immigrant population in the United States,46 the negative
effect that payday lending could have on this population should not be
ignored.
41. Georgetown Survey, supra note 15, at 28-47.
42. See id. at 33 (explaining that "the percentage of payday advance customers with
some college (36.1%) is nearly one and one half times greater than the 21.1% of adults with
some college" in the general population).
43. See id. at 28 (noting that over half of payday advance customers have family
incomes between $25,000 and $49,000); Caskey, Fringe Banking, supra note 25, at 18 ("The
vast majority [of customers are] employed and [have] a household income between $15,000
and $60,000.").
44. See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also Georgetown Survey, supra
note 15, at 28 (finding that average household incomes for payday loan customers ranged
from 25,000 to 50,000, which is consistent with both the industry study and the Wisconsin
study cited above).
45. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
46. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, TRENDS IN UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRATION:
UNDOCUMENTED INFLOW Now TRAILS LEGAL INFLOW (Pew Hispanic Ctr. 2008) (reporting
that the U.S. experienced rapid growth in the undocumented immigrant population between
1990 and 2006, reaching 11.9 million in 2008); see also JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA
COHN, A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 10,
(reporting that seventy-six percent of the undocumented immigrant population in the U.S.
are Hispanics and that undocumented immigrants make up 4% of the population and 5.4% of
the workforce).
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Like payday loan customers, undocumented immigrants on average
have low to moderate incomes, are employed, and have some education.47
Unlike payday loan customers, undocumented immigrants generally have
not had a negative experience with credit in the past. In fact, evidence
suggests that they have little to no experience with credit.48 Several factors
contribute to the relatively high level of unbanked immigrants, but evidence
suggests that undocumented immigrants are increasingly accessing
mainstream banking services.49
Despite their relative inexperience with finance, several factors
indicate that undocumented immigrants might find payday loans attractive.
First, undocumented immigrants tend to live in urban neighborhoods that
are heavily populated with payday loan outlets.50 Second, undocumented
immigrants are probably already familiar with payday lending if they
formerly used these outlets for check cashing services, in person utility bill-
pay services, or remittance services.51 Moreover, the ostensible structure of
payday loans, as a fee-for-service transaction, rather than a traditional loan
that requires periodic payments based on an interest rate and loan due date,
47. See PASSEL & COHN supra note 10, at 4-5 (comparing the demographic
characteristics of undocumented immigrants of Mexican birth to native born Americans).
48. Data suggest that more immigrants are accessing mainstream banking services
over time. Compare SHEILA C. BAIR, IMPROVING ACCESS TO THE U.S. BANKING SYSTEM
AMONG RECENT LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS 4 (Multilateral Inv. Fund 2003), available at
http://www.iadb.org/exr/PRENSA/images/IADBFULLREPORT.pdf (noting that less than
50% of Latino immigrants own a bank account), with ANNA PAULSON, AUDREY SINGER,
ROBIN NEWBERGER & JEREMY SMITH, FINANCIAL ACCESS FOR IMMIGRANTS: LESSONS FROM
DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES 6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi. & Brookings Inst. 2006), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/conununity-development/files/fai-lessons-fromdiverse-perspec
tives.pdf (noting that 63% of immigrant households have a checking account).
49. See ROBERTO SURO, SERGIO BENDIXEN, B. LINDSAY LOWELL & DULCE C.
BENAVIDES, BILLIONS IN MOTION: LATINO IMMIGRANTS, REMITTANCES, AND BANKING 13-18
(Pew Hispanic Ctr. & Multilateral Inv. Fund 2001), available at http://pewhispanic.org/
files/reports/13.pdf (noting that undocumented immigrants lack interest in mainstream
banking because of the high fees, minimum deposit requirements, and, for some, legal status
concerns); Laura Sonderup, The Business of Immigrant Markets: Providing Access to
Financial Services, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 503, 503 (Fall 2006) (explaining the
banking industry's interest in including undocumented immigrants in its customer base).
50. See PASSEL & COHN, supra note 10, at 1-3 (noting that the majority of
undocumented immigrants live in urban areas); RICK JURGENS, REPORT: UTILITIES AND
PAYDAY LENDERS: CONVENIENT PAYMENTS, KILLER LOANS (Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr.
2007), http://www.consumerlaw.org/reports/contentlpaydayutility.pdf (providing cover
photo of a payday loan storefront with advertisements written in Spanish).
51. See JURGENS, supra note 50, at 3 ("Hundreds of high-cost lenders have
arrangements with utilities to collect bill payments from their customers, according to a
review of authorized payment locations listed on the web sites or in regulatory filings of 21
large utility companies that operate in states that allow payday lending.").
ACHIEVING THE AMERICAN DREAM IN DEBT?
might make more sense to a population that has "limited English speaking
ability, a cultural distrust of banking institutions, and minimal experience in
dealing with the U.S. banking system.,
52
Perhaps most importantly, Hispanic undocumented immigrants are at
high risk to incur emergency medical expenses because most
undocumented immigrants are uninsured.53 Paradoxically, the cost of
health care for uninsured Americans far exceeds the cost for insured
Americans, 4 and the high cost of care, in general, is bankrupting otherwise
healthy families who have some health care coverage.55 Even a relatively
minor adverse health event could cause an uninsured undocumented
immigrant to incur a very large and unexpected expense that could make a
payday loan attractive.
Finally, undocumented immigrants are unlikely to seek legal
protection or report their activities to authorities for fear that they will be
deported. Some states, like Florida and Mississippi, have linked formerly
separate agency records with law enforcement databases in order to conduct
raids on undocumented immigrant populations in their communities.56
52. BAIR, supra note 48, at 2-3.
53. See PASSEL & COHN, A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 10, at 18-19 (noting that 59% of undocumented adults had no health
insurance during all of 2007, which is "more than double the uninsured share among legal
immigrants and four times the uninsured share among U.S.-born adults"). The report also
explained that "[t]he children of unauthorized immigrant adults are less likely than their
parents to lack insurance, but their uninsured rate is still substantially higher than that of
U.S.-bom children." Id at 18.
54. See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, PATIENTS As CONSUMERS: COURTS,
CONTRACTS, AND THE NEW MEDICAL MARKETPLACE, 106 U. MICH. L. REV. 643, 664 (2008).
[H]ospitals bill uninsured patients [on average] 250% more than insured
patients. ... list prices have increased almost three times more than costs, and
markups over costs have more than doubled, from 74% to 164%.... Charges
alleged or found in recent lawsuits include $20,000 for two nights'
hospitalization for pregnancy complications, $12,863 for a day's treatment for
shortness of breath, "$52 for a single tablet of Tylenol with codeine," and a half
million dollars for twenty-three days of treatment-twice what Medicare
insurance allowed.
Id.
55. See David U. Himmelstein, Elizabeth Warren, Deborah Thome, & Steffie
Woolhandler, Illness And Injury As Contributors To Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Feb. 2,
2005, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w5.63/DC1 (last visited on Apr.
17, 2009) (finding that in 2001, "1.9-2.2 million Americans (filers plus dependents)
experienced medical bankruptcy" and noting that many of these filers had health insurance
when the illness began) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
56. See, e.g., Martin Kaste, Employers May Face More Immigration Scrutiny, NPR,
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Because any state contact threatens deportation, under the current system
payday lenders could virtually ignore any applicable state or federal
regulations when dealing with undocumented immigrants, knowing that
those customers will never report illegal lending practices. Effective
regulation must take these concerns into account to make sure that the
industry does not prey upon the undocumented.
IV. Legislation and Regulation Governing Payday Lending
Historically, federal law governing payday lenders, has focused on
requiring lenders to adequately disclose important aspects of the loans they
provide, while state law has focused on controlling the structure and kinds
of loans lenders may offer.57 Federal regulations have not been adequately
enforced against payday lenders, and states have not been able to
adequately enforce their laws governing payday lending without banning
the industry from operating within its borders. 58 Growing concern over the
deleterious effects of payday lending has led many more states to pass laws
that attempt to ban payday lending, with mixed success.59 As a result,
Congress has now proposed two competing bills that could determine
whether payday lending will continue in the United States. This Part
discusses current federal and state regulation of payday lending, and the
historical problems states have had with the industry. The next Part will
discuss and evaluate the two bills currently in Congress.
Apr. 3, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102723012 (last visited
on Apr. 17, 2009) (discussing the first workplace raid for undocumented immigrants under
the Obama administration and predicting the Obama administration's response to illegal
immigration) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice); Should Local Police Add Immigration Beat?, NPR, Mar. 9, 2009,
http://www.npr.orgltemplates/story/story.php ?storyld=101612103 (last visited on Apr. 17,
2009) (discussing section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allows state
and local police to enforce federal immigration law) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). See generally Nicholas Neidzwski, The
Unconstitutionality of Mississippi's Employment Protection Act and a Framework for
Assessing Similar State Immigration Employment Laws, 16 WASH. & LEE. J.C.R. & SOC.
JusT. (forthcoming Fall 2009).
57. See infra sections A and B of this Part.
58. See id.
59. See id.
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A. Existing Federal Legislation
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA)60 requires that "creditors," including
payday lenders disclose certain facts about their loan products to
customers. 61 Rather than providing rate caps, TILA requires only that
creditors comply with various rate disclosure requirements and advertising
62restrictions. TILA has separate disclosure requirements for oral and
written inquiries. Payday loan employees are not required to orally
volunteer the applicable APR for a loan, but if a customer requests this
information, the employee is required to disclose the correct APR.63 TILA
requires that payday lenders provide written information about the loan,
including the fees, repayment due date, and APR before the loan is
consummated. 64 Payday lenders are also required to disclose their fees as
an APR if they choose to advertize their rates.65
Evidence suggests that payday lenders do not comply with TILA. In
two recently conducted surveys in Ohio, roughly one third or fewer payday
loan employees attempted to disclose the applicable APR.66 Most lenders
either reported the APR incorrectly or stated that there was no APR on a
two-week loan, clearly in violation of TLA.6 7 Lenders also violate TILA's
advertising regulations.68  Most creditors surveyed in the Ohio study
advertised their services, but the majority (84%) "had fee schedules that
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2000).
61. See 12 C.F.R. § 226(2)(a)(14) (2001) (stating that "transactions commonly known
as "payday loans" constitute credit for purposes of TILA").
62. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 14 ("Primarily a credit disclosure statute, TILA
does not generally regulate what terms a creditor must offer, but requires that those terms,
whatever they are, be uniformly disclosed to the consumer.").
63. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17 (2001).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 38-39 (noting that an Ohio survey found that only
32% of payday lenders disclosed applicable APR; CFA's 2001 Rent-A-Bank Payday
Lending Report, found that "only 21% of payday lenders in twenty-six states verbally
disclosed an APR in response to a customer's inquiry").
67. See id. ("32% of the payday lenders surveyed denied that there was an APR
associated with the loan while 18% claimed they did not know the APR. Roughly, 14%
stated that the $15 finance charge was the APR, and one of the twenty-two lenders answered
evasively: 'That doesn't count because you don't have the money for a whole year."').
68. See id. at 40 ("TILA provides that if a creditor advertises the finance charge, the
cost of credit must be stated 'as an annual percentage rate."'); 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(b) (2002)
(same).
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failed to disclose the APR for each loan amount."69 Finally, payday lenders
often fail to disclose the terms of the loan prior to completing the contract,
as required by TILA. 70  The Ohio survey found that although payday
lenders made the APR available to borrowers, borrowers were not allowed
to keep these documents or inspect them prior to signing the loan
agreement.7'
In addition to the TILA, Congress passed legislation in 2006 to protect
military personnel from high payday loan rates. The Limitations on Terms
of Consumer Credit Extended to Service Members and Dependents,72
commonly known as the "Military Lending Act," caps payday loan rates
offered to military personnel at 36%.
B. State Regulation: Bold, Yet Ineffective
State regulation of payday lenders varies. Payday loans are currently
banned in fifteen states and the District of Columbia.74 In states that do not
ban payday lending, state laws have traditionally attempted to regulate
payday lending by restricting the number of times a customer may
refinance the same loan, setting a rate ceiling on short-term consumer loans,
or capping fees charged by lenders.75 Recently, a few states have coupled
69. Johnson, supra note 18, at 40.
70. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(1) (2007) ("The creditor shall make the disclosures
required by this subpart clearly and conspicuously in writing, in a form that the consumer
may keep.").
71. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 44 (noting that when survey participants "asked the
loan clerks to allow them to take the contracts and review them prior to signing, 77% of the
payday loan clerks surveyed would not allow the consumer to take the contract."). Johnson
further notes that "[s]ome clerks even held onto the corner of the written contract while the
research assistants were reviewing it prior to signing." Id.
72. 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006).
73. Id.
74. See Payday Loans, AMERICANs FOR FAiRNESs IN LENDING, Jan. 2009,
http://www.affil.org/consumer-rsc/payday.php# (last visited Apr. 17, 2009) (explaining that
payday loans are illegal in Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Vermont, and West Virginia) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice). In states that ban payday lending, the ban is usually
explicitly stated in regulation. Id.
75. See Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 159 (2004). As
the following table shows, rent-a-bank has allowed payday lenders to circumvent state
efforts to cap rates or fees. Id.
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traditional regulations with loan tracking systems that are intended to both
enforce existing laws and gather reliable data on the industry's practices.76
Despite the growing appetite for reform in many states, payday lenders
continue to find ways to circumvent state laws and provide loans at rates
that far exceed standard caps. 7  Virginia and several other states are
Table 1. Average Payday Loan APRs by State Regulatory Environment, 2001
Regulatory Environment States Surveyed Avg. APR
Usury ceiling on small loans GA, MA, MD, NY, PA, VA 606%
prohibits payday lending
No usury ceiling, payday lending NM, WI 504%
permitted
"Safe harbor" permits payday AZ, CA, CO, DC, FL, IA, 443%
lending, caps fees IL, KY, NC, OH, OR, SC,
TX
National average 470%
Source: CFA/ PIRG, 2001
Id; see also ELIZABETH RENUART, EMILY CAPLAN, MICHAEL WROBLEWSKI, GAIL
HILLEBRAND, & JEAN ANN Fox, SMALL DOLLAR LOAN PRODUCTS: INTRODUCTION TO THE
SCoREcARD (Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr., Consumers Union, & Consumer Fed. of Am. 2008),
http://www.nclc.org/reports/content/CU-Small-Dollar-IntroScorecard-8-28-08.pdf (last visi-
ted on Apr. 17, 2009) (using 2008 data to rate whether existing state laws are effective at
protecting state residents from abusive payday lending practices) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). Virginia scored an F and
had an effective APR of 350% on two-week payday loans. Id. at 13.
76. See, e.g., KEITH ERNST, JOHN FARRIS & URIAH KING, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC
COST OF PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING 7 n.21 (Cntr. for Responsible Lending, rev. ed.
2004), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/CRLpaydaylendingstudyl21803.pdf (de-
scribing the Florida system which prohibits "making a payday loan while another loan is
outstanding with another lender," and enforces this prohibition "by the use of a statewide
database that tracks individual borrowers"). Note, however, that "payday lenders partnering
with banks through [rent-a-bank] schemes claim preemption of state payday laws and
routinely do not follow state law requirements." Id. Kentucky recently passed a similar law
that requires the state to maintain a database to track payday lending. See Elizabeth
Fairchild, Washington, Idaho, Kentucky Pass Payday Loan Bills, PERSONAL MONEY STORE,
http://personalmoneystore.commoneyblog/2009/03/26/washington-idaho-kentucky-pass-
payday-loan-bills/ (last visited on Apr. 17, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
77. See, e.g., Driehaus, supra note 8 (noting that in addition to Ohio, "Georgia, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon and Pennsylvania had to pass a second round of
legislation or aggressively enforce regulations after their initial reform efforts"). Whether or
not new reforms are effective is yet to be seen. Id.
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currently revisiting 2008 payday lending legislation that has so far failed to
curb abusive lending practices in their states.78
The "rent-a-bank" practice, common in the industry, has thwarted state
attempts to regulate payday lending. Rent-a-bank refers to partnerships
between Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) banks and payday
lenders "to offer 'agent-assisted loan programs. ' '7 9 Through agent-assisted
loan programs, the National Bank Act allows nationally chartered banks to
export the interest rates charged in their home states to customers in other
states.80 Payday lenders partner with national banks chartered in states that
do not cap interest rates on small loans; they then export rates to other
states, regardless of whether those other states have usury laws or rate
ceilings that apply to payday lending.8' Rent-a-bank is highly effective and
the most significant barrier to effective regulation at the state level.82 In
2005, the FDIC issued guidance83 that limits, but does not eliminate, the
"rent-a-bank" loophole that has for years allowed payday lenders to
circumvent state usury ceilings.84 The guidance restricts the number of
payday loans the lender may issue and requires banks to implement
programs by which borrowers with long-term credit needs can transition
78. See Jeff E. Schapiro, Lending Restrictions Pass Senate Unanimously, RICHMOND
TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 30, 2009, available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/
news/newsbriefs/lending-restrictions-pass-senate-unanimously.html (describing new
Virginia legislation designed to close loopholes in ineffective 2008 legislation that failed to
curb payday lending as intended).
79. KARGER, supra note 16, at 78.
80. Id.
81. See id. ("Lenders with rent-a-bank partnerships often charge higher interest rates,
make larger loans, or maybe repeat loans that violate state laws.").
82. See Donna Tanoue, Chairman, FDIC, Keynote Address, Seventh Annual
Greenlining Economic Development Summit (June 13, 2000), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/newslspeeches/archives/2000/spl 3JuneOO.html (describing
process known as "charter-renting" by which large banks rent out the state usury law of their
charter state to payday lenders operating across the nation to circumvent state rate capping
legislation).
83. FIDC, Financial Institution Letter, FIL-14-2005, Mar. 1, 2005, available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/fil l405.html.
84. See FDIC's Revised Examination Guidance on Payday Lending, CTR. FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, http://www.responsiblelending.org/issueslpayday/policy/page.jsp?
itemlD=28012674 (last visited on Apr. 17, 2009) (noting that the guidance calls "on banks to
develop procedures to ensure that they do not make payday loans to customers who have had
payday loans outstanding from any lender for a total of more than three months in the
previous 12 months") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
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their short-term payday loans to long-term loans, but it does not specifically
prohibit rate exporting to restricted jurisdictions. 5
V. Proposed Solutions
Trade groups argue that payday lenders cannot function if interest rates
are capped at 36% per year. 6 Financial Service Centers of America, a trade
group representing "neighborhood financial centers," estimated, however,
that 2007 payday loan volume exceeded thirteen billion dollars and that
more than thirty-two million loans were made nation-wide. 87 Studies report
that payday lenders make at least a 30% return on investments, and some
industry advertisements for investment in payday loan corporations suggest
much higher returns.88 With such high profits, payday lenders should not
be allowed to prey on low- and middle-income households. Because states
have largely failed to regulate payday lending, despite significant efforts,
payday loan customers need a federal solution. 9
85. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. Note that payday lenders continue to
evade state restrictions with dexterity; see, e.g., Marc Lifsher, Internet Payday Lenders With
Ties to Indians Dodge California Regulators, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2009,
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-internet-loans 13-2009apr 13,0,5737402.story
(explaining that payday lenders have gone online and partnered with Indian tribes in yet
another ploy to circumvent state usury laws).
86. See Stephen J. Dubner, Pity the Payday Lenders?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2006,
http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/20O6/08/21/pity-the-payday-lenders/ (last visited on
Apr. 17, 2009) (quoting industry spokeswoman stating, "[a]t a 36% APR, the fee on a $100
payday advance would be $1.38, less than 100 per day. Payday advance lenders could not
even meet employee payroll at that rate, let alone cover employee payroll, other fixed
business expenses and make a profit") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
87. See PATRICIA J. CIRILLO, SURVEY OF KEY FISCA MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS ON
TRANSACTION VOLUMES 9 (Cypress Research Group 2007), available at http://www.fisca.
org/Economic%20Inclusion%20Handout-Attachment%201.pdf (estimating the total gross
dollar amount of all payday advances at $13,236,686,046 and the total number of payday
advances at 32,443,313). But see Georgetown Survey, supra note 15, at 27 (suggesting that
payday lenders must charge an APR of at least one hundred percent just to break even).
88. See Barr, supra note 75, at 152-53 ("[Playday lending is a highly profitable
enterprise, with a return on sales of 30%."); Johnson, supra note 18, at 72 ("[L]enders like
Check 'n Go are advertising that if a national bank partners with it, the bank may receive a
20% return on equity.").
89. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 116-45 (explaining why a state solution will never
adequately regulate payday lending or provide the five minimum consumer protections that
must be included in any proposed federal regulation.); Barr, supra note 75, at 162-63 ("[I]t
is incumbent on the regulators to use their authority under the Federal Trade Commission
Act to take action against banks and thrifts that are engaged in 'unfair and deceptive trade
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A. Should Federal Legislation Ban Payday Lending?
It is not clear that federal legislation should ban payday lending. In
dealing with the industry, states have had two choices: (1) ban payday
lending within its borders or (2) allow it to exist, effectively, unregulated.
The fact that the industry has managed to thrive despite significant efforts
by states to substantially constrict its business model suggests that a
meaningful portion of the population demands access to short-term credit.
If Congress attempts to ban payday lending entirely, other short-term forms
of credit will almost certainly take the place of payday lending, thereafter
requiring an entirely new batch of legislation to deal with the new
industry's abusive practices. This Note accepts that the payday loan
industry has exploited the working poor since it became one of the primary
sources of short-term credit in the mid-1990s, but it does not foreclose the
possibility that good federal regulation could transform the industry into a
fair, yet viable, source of short-term credit for individuals with
compromised credit histories.
Regardless of whether Congress bans payday lending or attempts to
regulate it, undocumented immigrants must receive equal protection under
the new law. Federal law allows banks to extend credit to undocumented
immigrants. 90 It would be unfair to give undocumented immigrants access
to mainstream banking products without corresponding protection from
abusive lending practices that involve those accounts. It would also be
unwise. A recent Harvard Business School study found that involuntary
bank account closures increase by about 11% in areas with higher
concentrations of payday lending locations. 9' Mainstream banks stand to
benefit enormously by tapping into the undocumented immigrant customer
base. If payday loans given to undocumented immigrants cause banks to
close newly opened accounts for undocumented immigrants, neither the
immigrants nor the banks will benefit from the USA Patriot Act's
regulations. Perhaps most importantly, legislation that can curb abusive
payday lending without eliminating the industry must protect
practices' in the course of payday lending activities.").
90. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
91. See Dennis Campbell, Asis Martinez Jerez, & Peter Tufano, Bouncing Out of the
Banking System: An Empirical Analysis of Involuntary Bank Account Closures 2 (Harvard
Bus. Sch., Working Paper, 2008), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/econor-ic/eprg/
conferences/payments2008/campbell-jerez tufano.pdf (finding "that access to payday
lending seems to lead to higher rates of involuntary account closure").
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undocumented immigrants to ensure that the industry does not continue to
operate unregulated in the undocumented immigrant community.
B. Pending Federal Legislation
Two competing bills, both recently introduced by Democratic
members of the House and Senate, purport to effectively regulate the
payday loan industry. Senator Durbin's bill would amend TILA to include
a "maximum rate of interest" provision that caps consumer credit
transactions at 36% APR.92 The bill provides a limited exception for
ninety-day loans, but it highly restricts the fees the lender may charge and
limits consumers to one loan per year.93 A competing bill introduced by
Representative Luis Gutierrez would also amend TILA, but to "establish
additional payday loan disclosure requirements and other protections for
consumers, and for other purposes., 94 His bill would require disclosures in
English and Spanish; requires that loan documents include language in "14-
point bold font" that states that lenders will not press criminal charges for
delinquency; includes a mandatory extended payment plan, similar to what
is encouraged under 2005 FDIC guidance; and prohibits "rollovers" and
lending multiple loans to the same customer at the same time.95
Consumer protection groups who want to see payday loans banned
strongly favor Senator Durbin's bill because only double digit rate caps
have effectively banned payday lending.96 The payday loan industry backs
Representative Gutierrez's bill because it purports to restrict, not eliminate,
92. Protecting Consumers from Unreasonable Credit Rates Act of 2009, S. 500, 111 th
Cong. (2009), available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/11 1-s500/text.
93. See id. (noting that fees cannot exceed $30 or 5% of the credit limit, up to $120,
with other restrictions).
94. See Payday Loan Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1214, 111 th Cong. (2009), available
at http://www.opencongress.org/bil111 1-hi 214/text.
95. Id.
96. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUICK REFORM COULD PLUG $5 BILLION
HoLE IN WORKER WALLETS (2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/ payday-and-
the-economy.pdf.
Payday lending industry representatives have lobbied for other reforms, such as
payment plans and limits on loan amounts, because they understand that these
measures have done nothing to slow the rate at which they can flip loans to the
same borrowers. But an interest rate cap is the only measure that has proven
effective in putting an end to the cycle of debt caused by these loans.
Id. at 2.
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payday lending.97  Consumer groups have not noticed, however, that
Senator Durbin's bill would do nothing to protect undocumented
immigrants. As discussed in Part Three, even if payday loans are banned
(or capped at double-digit interest rates), payday lenders could still lend to
undocumented immigrants because the undocumented could never report
the lender for violating the rate cap. Senator Gutierrez's bill does provide
some protection for undocumented immigrants by requiring that loan
disclosures be made in Spanish, but it might not adequately protect
borrowers from predatory practices.
98
C. Solutions that Protect the Undocumented
Because Senator Durbin's bill would likely eliminate payday lending,
this Note does not consider it further. Representative Gutierrez's bill could
provide adequate protection for undocumented immigrants from abusive
payday lending practices if it is improved to protect against abusive lending
practices and to better include undocumented immigrants in the protections
offered.
Consumer groups have argued that the H.R. 1214 fails to protect
consumers on the following grounds: (1) the fee cap of fifteen cents per
97. In fact, some argue that Representative Gutierrez and other members of Congress
have been "bought" by the payday loan industry lobby. See Carey, House Preparing To
Legalize Payday Loans With 391% APRs, THE CONSUMERIST, Apr. 5, 2009,
http://consufleristscot5198880/house-preparing-to-legalize-payday-loans-with_39 l aprs (last
visited on Apr. 17, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
98. Compare Editorial, 391 Percent Payday Loan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at A20,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/20O9/04/13/opinion/13mon2.html?scp=2&sq=payday
%201oans&st=cse (discussing new House bill sponsored by Rep. Luis Gutierrez (D) that
would "allow payday operators to charge what amounts to an annual percentage rate of 391
percent"), with Luis V. Gutierrez, Letter to the Editor, Regulating Payday Loans, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fulipage.html?res=
9405EFD91630F931A 15757 COA96F9C8B63&scp=4&sq=gutierrez%20payday%20&st=
cse (arguing that the bill would "lower the annual percentage rate on payday loans for nearly
113 million Americans, ban 'rollovers,' create a mandatory repayment plan and establish a
federal floor on which stronger state and federal laws can then be built"). See also Donny
Shaw, Congress Going Easy on Payday Lenders, OPEN CONGRESS, Apr. 8, 2009,
httpJ/www.opencongress.org/articles/view/942-Congress-Going-Easy-on-Payday-Loan-Dealers
(last visited on Apr. 17, 2009) ("[A] range of consumer, community and civil rights groups
[believe that the Act] ... would actually protect the 'predatory payday loan business model
and will stall or stop the significant progress that has been made at the state level to curb
usurious lending."') (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
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dollar borrowed does not effect fairer APR rates, 99 (2) its narrow definition
of a payday loan would allow borrowers to evade its scope, as the industry
has so often done with state payday loan laws,1 °° (3) direct electronic access
authorization provisions, that allow creditors to gain e-access to consumer
banking accounts, is unsafe, unfair, and violates other federal laws, l01
(4) the bill only bans multiple loans from multiple lenders, but not multiple
loans from all lenders, 10 2 and (5) protections against unfair debt collection
do not do more than other, existing, laws to protect consumers. 10 3 Many of
these defects can be eliminated if the bill more generally defines payday
lending, eliminates specific definitions for "creditor" and "payday loan,"
and prohibits lenders from accessing borrowers' bank accounts
electronically. State experience with specific definitional language in
99. See Jean Ann Fox, Director of Financial Services, Consumer Federation of
America, Statement to the House, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit, Apr. 2, 2009, at 8, available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financial
svcsdem/foxtestimony.pdf (explaining that "[f]or the typical two-week payday loan term,
the fee authorized by H.R. 1214 translates to 391 percent APR. For a one-week loan, loans
would be authorized at 782 percent APR"). Fox also notes that "[d]escribing the costs
allowed by the bill as pennies per dollar and not mentioning the very short loan period for
payday loans can mislead people into believing that the bill sets a 15 percent annual interest
rate cap." Id.
100. See id. at 9 ("HR 1214 includes numerous requirements that must be met in order
for a payday loan to fall under its purview.").
101. See id. at 11-15 (providing several examples of situations in which a consumer
might compromise his or her relationship with a bank if a payday lender is allowed
electronic access to his or her account).
102. See id. at 15-16 (explaining why the bill's roll-over provision does not prevent
consumers from taking out more payday loans than they can afford at any given time).
103. See id. at 16-17 (explaining that "the Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC's
credit practices rule, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, state common law, and/or many
state laws" already prevent payday lenders from threatening criminal action against
defaulting debtors). Fox's statement references the case of Florida v. Ellis Crosby &
Assocs., Inc., where the Florida Attorney General brought a successful action against a
payday collection agency. Id. The complaint alleged that:
[d]efendant ECA and Defendant CROSBY illegally contacted consumers at
work, engaged in harassing, oppressive and abusive conduct, failed to identify
themselves as collections agents, falsely represented themselves as law
enforcement officers or attorneys, falsely threatened legal action, falsely
threatened criminal arrest, threatened violence, misrepresented that the
consumer had committed a crime, falsely represented the amount due, falsely
implied they were government investigators, falsely stated their office is in a
federal building, falsely claimed that an Order of Homeland Security prevented
disclosure of their address, falsely threatened to seize computers, falsely stated
that non-payment would result in arrest, and falsely stated that the sum owed
could only be paid in full.
id. at 9.
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payday lending regulation should teach Congressional leaders that payday
loans must be defined broadly to prevent the industry from evading the
scope of its legislation. Prohibiting lenders from having e-access to
borrower bank accounts will allow consumers to have greater control over
their finances and prevent payday lenders from drawing more than what is
required from a borrower's bank account to satisfy a payday loan. Rate
caps and additional regulation to protect consumers against unfair
collection practices are unnecessary. As discussed above, whether the
effective APR of a payday loan is usurious depends upon ones point of
view and is not conclusively demonstrated by data on either side of the
debate. Additional regulation to protect consumers against unfair collection
activity is already included in other federal legislation. To the extent that
provisions in the Gutierrez bill represent concessions by the payday loan
industry, they might have some force and effect, but funding for better
enforcement of existing regulations and/or the Gutierrez bill if it passes, is
essential to make sure stated reforms are implemented.
Assuming that H.R. 1214 can be improved to effect industry reform,
both the USA Patriot Act and the H.R. 1214 must be improved to
specifically protect undocumented immigrants from abusive payday loans.
First, the USA Patriot Act must require banks provide oral and written
instructional materials to customers who open accounts with an ITIN and
one or more piece of foreign identification. The instructional materials
must generally explain how mainstream bank products work, when the
customer can incur fees, and how the customer can avoid incurring fees. It
should also explain why payday loans make the customer more susceptible
to bank fees and involuntary account closures. Bank regulatory agencies
could be tasked with providing sample language for the oral and written
communication, and all communication must be provided in the language in
which the bank transaction was consummated.
H.R. 1214 must be improved to provide better protection against the
threat of criminal prosecution or deportation. Language in the loan
documents that states that the lender will not press criminal charges against
delinquent borrowers does not adequately protect undocumented
immigrants from the threat of such action by lenders and their collections
agencies. The bill should provide funding for a non-profit organization to
track the habits of collection agencies with respect to citizens, documented
immigrants and undocumented immigrants. Many states have active
consumer groups who monitor the lending practices of payday and other
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lenders in their states. 104 A grant program would provide Congress with
useful information about the banking habits of marginal borrowers and the
practices of payday lenders, and undocumented immigrants would not fear
that the organization would "out" their undocumented status to the
government. Coupled with funding for a non-profit study, the Gutierrez bill
should also mandate a federal payday loan database to track borrowers'
habits and ensure that lenders do not issue more than one loan to a
consumer at a time. 10 5 Similar to the Florida database, the federal database
could track the industry's practices and help enforce regulations that limit
the total outstanding principal amount of a payday loan that a consumer
may have at any given time.
Over time, it might become apparent that additional reforms are
needed to make the Gutierrez bill or future federal legislation more
effective at protecting consumers from unfair practices, but careful study of
the effect a federal solution can and would have on the industry and
consumers is necessary to help lawmakers craft effective controls on
potentially risky financial products before a ban is considered.
VI. Conclusion
Undocumented immigrants are at risk for abuse by the payday loan
industry, and their demographic characteristics suggest that they, too, are
likely to demand access to short-term forms of credit. States, however,
have not been able to successfully implement adequate industry regulation
to ensure that short-term credit is safe for most borrowers. Congress has
and should continue to take seriously the need for regulation of the payday
loan industry and seize the opportunity to legislate afforded by a
recessionary climate.
Whether a ban or regulation would be a better solution to the payday
loan problem as it applies to undocumented immigrants is debatable. A ban
104. See generally Ohio Coalition for Responsible Lending Home Page, http://ohio
coalitionforresponsiblelending.org/; Virginia Partnership to Encourage Responsible Lending
Home Page, http://www.virginiafairloans.org/news.html; Kentucky Coalition for Respons-
ible Lending Home Page, http://kyresponsiblelending.wordpress.com/.
105. See Gwyneth K. Shaw, Almost Here: Less Painful Payday Loans, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Apr. 21, 2001 (describing a Florida legislatively mandated database that tracks
how many payday loans a lender may issue to a borrower at any given time). The article
quotes Dorene Barker, a lobbyist for Florida Legal Services, who argues that the database
"will stop people from getting caught on the treadmill, which has been our biggest concern."
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would solve the payday loan problem but leave lenders much space to
create a new form of short-term credit that would present at-risk
populations with similar difficulties. Careful legislation of payday lenders
that provides funding to monitor and collect data on the industry, its
consumers, and the effect legislation has on both groups would help
Congress in the future to regulate payday loans in a way that (1) allows the
industry to continue and (2) provides low-income consumers, including
undocumented immigrants, with access to a fair form of micro-finance. To
collect this data, the government should provide grant funding to a non-
profit organization to study the effects of payday loans on undocumented
immigrants because the undocumented are more likely to participate in a
study conducted by a non-governmental organization.
Now that undocumented immigrants have access to checking accounts,
only adequate federal regulation can prevent the payday lending industry
from exploiting this population. In order to ensure the future financial
health of the undocumented immigrant population and the continued
success of the new relationship between this population and mainstream
banking institutions, Congress must provide undocumented immigrants
with the tools they need and the protection they deserve to deal with the
threat of predatory payday loans.
